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THE PATENTEE AND INFRINGER
BATTLEFRONT WORSENS AS COURTS SHARPEN
THE INFRINGER'S SWORD
David A. Haynes*
I. INTRODUCTION

Ms. General Counsel of Pharma Co. ("Pharma") arrives at work early
Monday morning to find reports that a rival company, InfringaLot, Inc.
("InfringaLot"), has begun selling a very similar drug for which Pharma
has a patent. Ms. General Counsel writes to InfringaLot informing it that
Pharma believes InfringaLot is selling a product which falls under
Pharma's patent. She ends the letter with an open offer to license the
patent to InfringaLot. She hopes the license offer will promote a cordial
business relationship and avoid expensive litigation, which would heavily
burden Pharma. InfringaLot rejects the letter and files a declaratory
judgment action for noninfringment and patent invalidity in federal district
court.
Prior to 2007, a federal district court would dismiss this action for
failure of subject-matter jurisdiction. ' However, due to landmark changes
in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals in 2007, this action can now proceed-a radical change in the
relationship between patentees and alleged infringers. 2
After years of inactivity, the Supreme Court recently tried its hand at
reforming patent law.3 Since 2004, the Court has granted certiorari, and
*J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, 2009; B.S., University of California at
Davis, 2006. The author would like to thank Professor Thomas Main for his invaluable advice
and assistance and Parry for his tremendous love and support throughout this entire process.
1. See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 IF, 2005 WL
5801276 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2. See, SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
3. Robert P. Taylor, The Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit: KSR, eBay, and
MedImmune, in 1 3 THANNUAL INST. ON INTELL. PROP. L. 71, 75 (Practicing Law Institute 2007);
see Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, Patent and Trademark Law: Key Decisionsfrom
Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, 237 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (2007) (noting "a sea change in patent law
jurisprudence").
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overturned, six cases involving patent law issues. Like any Supreme
Court holding, the lower courts must follow suit and adjust their
jurisprudence accordingly. 5 The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, as the
gatekeeper for patent law controversies, 6 has borne the impact of the
Supreme Court's rulings. 7 In January 2007, the Supreme Court holding in
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.8 tipped the first domino altering the
delicate balance between patentees 9 and patent infringers. 10 The balance
hinges on the extent would-be infringers" may enjoy certain tactical gains
by filing declaratory judgment actions. This balance is crucial because preemptive initiation of a declaratory
judgment may place patentees in poor
12
economic and legal positions.
Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act (hereinafter the
"Act") to allow parties to have their rights and relations declared by a court
without having to await suit by an opposing party. 13 Specifically regarding
patent law disputes, the Act "obviates scare-the-customer-and-run tactics
employed by the patentee that infected the competitive environment of the
business community with uncertainty and insecurity, characterized as a
danse macabre, the patent owner brandishing a Damoclean threat with a
sheathed sword." 14 The Act initially served to protect infringers from
threats by patentees; infringers could file a declaratory judgment action in
district court asking the court to declare the plaintiff a non-infringer and
4. Taylor, supra note 3, at 75; Scheinfeld, supra note 3, at 1.
5. Charles Anthony Smith, The Form and Function of the Supreme Court, HIST. NOw, Apr.
2008, http://www.historynow.org/04_2008/historian.html.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2000) ("The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction.. . of an appeal of a final decision from a district court of
the United States ... if the jurisdiction ... was based, in whole or in part, on section 1338
[patents, trademarks, copyrights] .... ").
7. Tony Mauro, High Court Ruling Could Spark Surge in Patent Challenges, LEGAL TIMES,
Jan. 10, 2007, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= 1i68336930333#.
8. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
9. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 (8th ed. 2004) ("One who either has been granted a
patent or has succeeded in title to a patent.").
10. Id. at 797 ("A person [or company] who interferes with one of the exclusive rights of a
patent... owner.").
11. Throughout this Article, when an infringer is mentioned, it implies that infringers are
"would-be" infringers, and part of the function of the declaratory judgment action is to determine
whether they are in fact infringers or not. No intrinsic value judgment is implied by the use of the
label infringer, but it serves as a convenience to this Article.
12. See, e.g., EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Del. 2007).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) (Declaratory Judgment Act).
14. JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD C. REILEY III & ROBERT C. HIGHLEY, PATENT

LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 20:8 (2nd ed. 2007) (noting that prior to the Declaratory Judgment Act,
large patentee companies would frequently threaten litigation and other adverse consequences to
possible infringers, particularly direct competitors).
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invalidate the patentee's patents. 15 Surely this device was effective against
the patentee bullies of the high-tech playground. 16 However, the Act has
profoundly disrupted the equilibrium between patentees and infringers in
favor of the infringer. 17
In a footnote of MedImmune, the Supreme Court candidly chided the
Federal Circuit for creating a legal test for declaratory judgment that was in
conflict with precedent. "8 Specifically, the Court disapproved of the
Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension of suit" test, which the Federal
Circuit had long since used to determine if a district court had declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. 19In response to MedImmune, the Federal Circuit in
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. eliminated its reasonable
apprehension of suit test 20 and adopted a new test that it soon named the
"all circumstances" test. 21

The reasonable apprehension of suit test focused on whether the
infringer had an objective reason to believe that a patentee would sue for
patent infringement. 22 Once this test was met, the declaratory judgment
action presented a case or controversy and could therefore be heard. 23
Under the Federal Circuit's new test for declaratory judgment actions
(hereinafter the "all circumstances test"), an infringer need not reasonably
apprehend suit; the patentee must merely contact and point out to the
infringer that its business activities fall "within the scope of the patentee's
patent rights."2 4 The "all circumstances" test is a substantially easier
standard for an infringer to meet, and thus presents a new strategic
opportunity in litigation. 25
The "all circumstances" declaratory judgment test, as required by the
Supreme Court in MedImmune and crafted by the Federal Circuit in
SanDisk, has made patentees vulnerable and placed them in poor financial
circumstances. 26 Patentees are forced to litigate or ignore their patent
15. Id.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n. 11 (2007).
Id.
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Teva Pharns. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1345 (Fed. Cir.

2007).
22. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1379.
23. GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III & HIGHLEY, supra note 14.
24. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
25. Id.
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rights because the "all circumstances" test permits infringers to file
declaratory judgment actions, which could effectively destroy the
patentee's business.27 The imbalance and negative effects of the "all
circumstances" test should be rebalanced by a combination of legislative
action and the exercise of district court discretion to dismiss certain
unmeritorious declaratory judgment actions.
This Article will explore aspects of declaratory judgment and its
application to current patent law issues. Part II of this Article will delve
into a brief background of the issues from the perspectives of patentees and
infringers. Furthermore, it will discuss declaratory judgment and its direct
application to patent law disputes. Part II will also discuss the policy
behind declaratory judgment actions, their legal effect, and a clarified rule
of law after SanDisk. Part III will discuss the paradigm shift from concern
over patentee abuse to concern over infringer abuse. A survey and analysis
of cases decided before and after SanDisk offers useful insight into the
changing dynamic within the patent industry. Part IV will assert novel
solutions to the problems that SanDisk creates for patentees. This section
will propose that district courts should exercise discretion and dismiss
declaratory judgment actions in the interest of public policy when
overzealous infringers abuse the SanDisk test. Part IV will also discuss the
failure of covenants not to sue as solutions. Finally, Part IV will then
propose a legislative remedy, which will ensure the re-establishment of
equilibrium between patentees and infringers.
II. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
A. A BriefBackground. Implications of SanDisk
In his concurring opinion in SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics,
Inc., Circuit Judge Bryson illuminated the broad and far-reaching impact of
the Federal Circuit's "all circumstances" test. 28 This new test permits an
infringer to bring declaratory judgment actions against a patentee merely
after the patentee informs the infringer that the patentee believes the
infringer's actions constitute infringement. 29 Under the common business
practice of licensing, any offer of a license to an infringer is an implied
26. See Id.
27. See Matthew Herper, Lilly, OtherDrugmakers Rely on Patents, FORBES, Aug. 16, 2000,
http://www.forbes.com/2000/08/16/mu4.html (discussing how Eli Lilly, as an example of other
pharmaceutical companies, lost 28% of its stock value after one patent was invalidated).
28. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (Bryson, J., concurring).
29. Id.
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assertion by the patentee that the proposed licensee is infringing.30
A brief look at industry practice offers a useful context to the
patentee-infringer relationship. A widespread business practice among
companies with valuable patent portfolios is to identify possible infringers
31
and offer them licensing agreements to preclude expensive litigation.
The patentee offers these infringers or licensees the use of its patents in
exchange for money or some other consideration.32 Unsurprisingly, it is
important for patentee companies, as an overall business strategy, to avoid
litigation and maintain amicable business relations within the relevant
industry. 33
Consider the predicament of the patentee. A subsequent assurance
that the patentee does not intend to sue is no longer enough to prevent
declaratory judgment jurisdiction.3 4 If the patentee affirms that the
licensee's conduct is, in its view, infringement, declaratory judgment
jurisdiction has been established.
Yet, if the patentee claims that the
licensee is not infringing, the patentee has likely irreparably damaged any
future patent infringement case.36
Having established the basic framework of the current patenteeinfringer relationship and the implications of the new test, it is relevant to
trace the history and policy of declaratory judgment actions.
B. PatentLaw and DeclaratoryJudgment: Why Are PatenteesAfraid of
It?
The Declaratory Judgment Act, first enacted in 1934, became the
sword with which infringers could ward off patentees' intimidation
tactics.37 Unfortunately, no legislative records, such as committee or floor
reports, from which to derive the policy goals of Congress, exist regarding
the Act during its original enactment in 1934. Courts and commentators

30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Id. at 1374 (describing the process of contacting an infringer company for a
licensing agreement). See H. Roy Berkenstock, The Licensing of Intellectual Property Rights,
THE FED. LAWYER, Nov./Dec. 2007, at 17 (discussing strategies for dealing with licensing
infringers and the common use of patent licenses in patent dispute settlements).
32. Berkenstock, supranote 3 1, at 17.

33. Id.
34. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000). Originally enacted in 1934, the Declaratory Judgment Act is
currently codified in Section 2201.
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inferred much of the policy behind the Act regarding patent disputes. 38
The Act permits a court, within its discretion, to declare the rights of all
parties involved and to act as a final adjudication of the matter.3 9
The Act represents the infringer's sword or pre-emptive strike
because the infringer no longer needs to await the service of the complaint
from the patentee, but discovers quickly its rights in regards to the disputed
patents. 40 In such cases, the infringer brings a declaratory judgment action
for non-infringement and/or patent invalidity. In such a suit, the infringer
could be judicially declared a non-infringer and the patentee's patents
could be invalidated, thereby allowing the now declared non-infringer 42
to
continue to legally use such technologies and even patent the technology.
"After the Act, those competitors [infringers] were no longer
restricted to an in terrorem choice between the incurrence of a growing
potential liability for patent infringement and abandonment of their
enterprises; they could clear the air by suing for a judgment that would
settle the conflict of interests. ' 43 This new device for infringers is effective
not only because infringers can quickly determine their rights in regards to
patents, but also because the court may declare the patent invalid. 44 To
declare a patent invalid and remove the competitive protection of the patent
system can be devastating for companies, especially those which thrive on
novel technologies. 45
C. Tracingthe Roots of DeclaratoryJudgment: Before Medlmmune and
SanDisk
Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth is one of the
earliest and most seminal Supreme Court opinions that explicates and
applies the Declaratory Judgment Act.46
The opinion shaped a
constitutional framework for determining when a district court has the
authority to hear a declaratory judgment action. 47 Although the case
concerned insurance policy coverage disputes, the legal analysis is
38. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384 (discussing the policy behind the Declaratory Judgment
Act).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2000).
40. Id.
41. GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III & HIGHLEY, supra note 14.
42. Id.
43. Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
44. GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III
& HIGHLEY, supra note 14.
45. See e.g., Herper, supra note 27.
46. Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
47. Id. at 240-41.
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pertinent in explaining the Federal Circuit tests. 48 Drawing from the
"actual controversy" language of the Act and the Constitution, the Court
recognized that the prevailing principle of declaratory judgment is
constitutionally-based. 49
Under Article III, section 2 of the Constitution, the power of the
judiciary is limited to adjudicating all "cases" and "controversies.
Based upon this constitutional principle, the Court concluded that the Act
cannot be used beyond the "cases" and "controversies" limits. 51 The Court
declared, "A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a difference
or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic
or moot."' 52 The Court held that declaratory judgment is only appropriate
if: (1) there is a case or controversy, as those tenns of art are defined and,
(2) there is a real and non-hypothetical situation between the parties with
opposing concrete legal interests. 3
Expanding upon the foundation of Aetna and a gamut of half-century
of common law, the Federal Circuit began to establish a more refined
declaratory judgment test. 54
Arrowhead Industrial Water, Inc. v.
Ecolochem, Inc. set out the next Federal Circuit test for declaratory
judgment actions, which was based on the constitutional framework
established in Aetna.55 For many decades after Arrowhead Industrial
Water, the Federal Circuit required a showing that the patentee's behavior
must have created "a reasonable apprehension" in the infringer in order to
have declaratory judgment jurisdiction.56
This standard required
apprehension that the patentee would sue based on the patent dispute and
that the infringer engaged in acts that might subject it to an infringement
suit (hereinafter the "reasonable apprehension test"). 57
The first prong of the Federal Circuit's reasonable apprehension test
48. Id. at 237.
49. Id. at 239-40.
50. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

51. Aetna, 300 U.S. at 240 ("The Declaratory Judgment Act must be deemed to fall within
this ambit of congressional power, so far as it authorizes relief which is consonant with the
exercise of the judicial function in the determination of controversies to which under the
Constitution the judicial power extends.").
52. Id. at 240.
53. Id. at 240-41.
54. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953 (Fed. Cir.
1987); see also Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir.

1988).
55. Arrowhead,846 F.2d at 735.
56. See, Sandisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005 WL 5801276
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
57. Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 737.
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focused on the conduct of the patentee and whether it would reasonably
indicate intent to initiate a lawsuit.5 8 The second prong asked whether the
infringer's activity was infringement upon the patent in question. 59 By
inquiring into the reasonable apprehension of the infringer and behavior of
the patentee, the Federal Circuit conformed to Aetna and the case and
controversy requirement. 60 Thus, the test took into account a reasonable
apprehension on the part of the infringer. 6' The reasonable apprehension
test required the patentee to behave in a way that was sufficient to put a
reasonable person on notice that a lawsuit was forthcoming. 62
D. The Aftermath of Medlmmune and SanDisk: Clarifyingthe Current
Rule of Law in Patent Disputes
Until early 2007, the reasonable apprehension test was the law relied
upon by both patentees and infringers.63 However on January 9, 2007,
when Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. was decided, the Supreme Court
rejected the reasonable apprehension test. 6'
In a footnote, the Court noted that reasonable apprehension is not
necessary to satisfy the constitutional and statutory requirement, as
explicated in Aetna, of a justiciable controversy. 65 In fact, the Court
indicated that the reasonable apprehension test was in conflict with
Supreme Court case law.66 Subsequent to Medlmmune, the Federal Circuit
heard SanDisk, which created a forum to adjust its long-standing
declaratory judgment jurisprudence
in accordance with the Supreme
67
Court's decision in MedImmune.
SanDisk and STMicroelectronics ("ST") were both in the business of
flash memory products. 68 In the first contact between the parties, ST's vice
president of intellectual property wrote to SanDisk requesting a crosslicense agreement. 6 9 ST believed that SanDisk was infringing upon ST's

58. Id. at 736.
59. Id. at 738.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 736.
Sandisk, 2005 WL 5801276 at *5.
Id.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 133 n. 11(2007).
Id. at 118.
Id. at 133 n.ll.

66. Id.
67. See, SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
68. Id.at 1374.

69. Id.
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flash memory patents and requested a meeting. 7 ST hoped to gain patent
licenses and/or other consideration from SanDisk in exchange for the
continued use of ST's patents.
After several meetings and exchanges, communications broke down
and SanDisk filed a lawsuit against ST for declaratory judgment.72 The
District Court subsequently dismissed the action for lack of controversy as
required by declaratory judgment actions. " The court focused on the
reasonable apprehension of the test, stating that SanDisk did not have
reasonable apprehension that ST would file suit against it for patent
infringement. 74
Drawing upon MedImmune, the SanDisk court discarded the
"reasonable apprehension" prong of the declaratory judgment test,75 and
attempted to create a new test, which was oblique at best:
We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent
based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of
another party [infringer], and where that party contends that it
has the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an
Article III cause or controversy will arise ....
Months later, the Federal Circuit referred to the test as the "all
circumstances" test. 77
This current test no longer focuses on any reasonable apprehension by
the infringer, but rather takes into account all activity between the patentee
and the infringer.78 Based upon the new test, the SanDisk court upheld the
declaratory judgment action "because ST has engaged in a course of
conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce its patent
rights." 79
At first blush, the "all circumstances" test may seem to improve on
the reasonable apprehension test. However, Circuit Judge Bryson's

70. Id.at 1375.
71. Id. at 1374-76 (describing how SanDisk and ST had a series of meetings and
communications which discussed patent infringement analyses and exchange of patent licenses).
72. Id. at 1376.
73. SanDisk, 480 F.3d. at 1376.
74.
75.
76.
77.
2007).
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 1380.
Id.at 1381.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
SanDisk,480 F.3d at 1384.
Id. at 1383.
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To
concurring opinion revealed the test's hidden implications. 8 0
understand Judge Bryson's concerns, one must first recognize the typical
scenario of a patentee offering a license to an infringer to avoid litigation,
settle disputes, and promote business relationships. 8' A patentee's offer of
a license to an infringer impliedly suggests that the infringer's business
activities are within the scope of the patentee's rights.82 In reality, the only
reason to offer an unsolicited patent license is to suggest that the patentee is
prepared to enforce its patent rights. 83 Thus, under the "all circumstances"
test, any offer of a patent license to an infringer will permit the infringer to
sue for declaratory judgment.8 4 The majority conveniently avoided any
discussion of these broad implications and decided the case on its facts. 85
The SanDisk court further held that ST's express declaration that it
had no plans to sue SanDisk did not dispel a controversy. 86 The court
emphasized that behavior is more reliable evidence of intent than words. 87
When such minimal behavior by the patentee triggers the ability of the
infringer to bring a declaratory judgment action, the patentee may be
deterred from risking the validity of its patent. Consequently, the patentee
is put between "a rock and a hard place," unable to offer a patent license
without exposing itself to possible patent invalidation by declaratory
judgment. 88
In the recent case of Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., the
Federal Circuit further refined the analytical framework of the "all
circumstances" test. 89 The Benitec court first reaffirmed the holding in
SanDisk and suggested a "useful question" in determining whether a
controversy exists for declaratory judgment. 90 The court posed the
question: "[W]hat, if any, cause of action the declaratory judgment
defendant may have against the declaratory judgment plaintiff"? 9'

80. Id. at 1384.
81. Berkenstock, supranote 31, at 16-17.
82. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384.
83. See Teva Pharms., 482 F.3d at 1330; see also infra text accompanying notes 86-91.
84. SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384.
85. Id. at 1384.
86. Id. at 1383.
87. Id. at 1382-83.
88. If the patentee is to offer a license, it is most likely demonstrating intent to enforce its
patent rights, as required by the "all circumstances" test. However, if the patentee wishes to use
the license as a means to avoid litigation, it has to bare the possibility of being brought into court
under declaratory judgment. See Berkenstock, supra note 31, at 16-17.
89. Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc., 495 F.3d 1340, 1343-44 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
90. Id. at 1344.
91. Id.
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This analytical framework seems to affirm the slippery slope of the
"all circumstances" test asserted in SanDisk.92 It is difficult to imagine a
scenario in which the answer to the Benitec court's question would be "no
cause of action."' 93 The question is concerned with what causes of action
the patentee may have against the infringer? 94 Certainly, in every possible
situation in which a patentee is offering a license to an infringer, the
patentee may have a cause of action against the infringer for patent
infringement. In reality, it is unfathomable that a patentee would offer an
unsolicited license to an infringer without the implicit suggestion that they
may have a cause of action against the infringer. 95 Thus, it appears that
Benitec serves to sharpen the infringer's declaratory judgment sword by
pre-litigation, and
emphasizing that a patentee must essentially abandon
96
negotiations.
agreement
license
even mid-litigation,
III. PATENTEES AFTER SANDISK: THE NEW LEGAL REPERTOIRE AND
IMBALANCE

A. The ParadigmShift: The Patentee Transitionsfrom Scare-and-Run to
Run-and-Run
Congress enacted the Declaratory Judgment Act 97 to shield accused
infringers from the characteristically behemoth, and often litigious,
patentees. 98 Given that patents are frequently the life-blood of many
corporations, it is in the best interest of a patentee corporation to assert its
ability to enforce and protect its patent at the earliest point possible. 99
Thus, the Act serves to stabilize the relationship between patentees and
alleged infringers by giving infringers the device of declaratory
judgment. 100

However, SanDisk and the subsequent opinions affirming it, turn the
92. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
93. Benitec, 495 F.3d at 1344.
94. Certainly, one can only hope that the Benitec court is not asking a district court judge to
pre-determine the merits of a case before even analyzing if the court has jurisdiction under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.
95. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1384.
96. Benitec, 495 F.3d 1340.

97. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
98. GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III & HIGHLEY, supra note 14; Arrowhead Indus. Water,
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
99. See Herper, supra note 27.

100. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (2000).
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important public policy goal of protecting alleged infringers and stabilizing
the patent-centered economic marketplace on its head. 101In the continued
attempt to calm the patentee beast, more than the patentee's scare tactics
are gone. The formerly viable and less expensive 102 option of patent
licensing in the infringement context has been removed from the patentee's
repertoire of legal measures as an alternative to litigation. If a patentee is
subject to patent invalidation by declaratory judgment at the mere
suggestion of a license, the natural result is that the patentee must ignore
the patent infringement, commence expensive litigation, 103 or risk
declaratory judgment and possible subsequent patent invalidation. '04
The removal of the licensing or negotiation measure causes an
imbalance. 105 The "all circumstances" test creates an imbalance in the
patentee-infringer relationship which can be seen through a careful
examination of subsequent district court cases which have attempted to
apply the SanDisk rule. 106 Many of these cases, if not directly comparing
the old result before SanDisk, serve as convenient comparative tools to
reveal the negative implications for patentees. 107
B. Establishingthe ParadigmShift: A Case Study Through United States
District Courts and the Federal Circuit
The suit begins when an infringer files a complaint against the
patentee for a declaratory judgment that the patents be declared noninfringed, invalid, or both. 108 The patentee or defendant in this action will
typically file a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss
for lack of subject matter-jurisdiction. 109 This Article will focus on the
point at which the court rules on the motion to dismiss-the crucial phase
in demonstrating the paradigm shift.
101. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
102. The costs associated with patent licensing from sharing patents with the infringer is
technically negated by the valuable consideration required by the licensing contract.
103. Cost ofLitigation Haunts U.S. CorporationsMore than Winning Cases, INS. J., Nov. 7,
2005, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/magazines/east/2005/l1/07/features/62312.htm; NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 38

(2004).
104. GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III & HIGHLEY, supra note 14.
105. See infra Part III.B. (cases surveying and analyzing the imbalance created by the new
test).
106. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cit. 2007); See
infra Part III.B.1-4.
107. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d 1372.
108. See, e.g., EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Del. 2007).
109. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(l).
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1. EchoStar Satellite LLC v. FinisarCorp.
The relevant facts of EchoStar are exceedingly similar to SanDisk. 110
The defendant patentee, Finisar, contacted the plaintiff-infringer, EchoStar,
to discuss a licensing agreement because Finisar believed that EchoStar had
been infringing a satellite technology patent. "' In the meantime, Finisar
filed a patent infringement suit against DirecTV. 112 Finisar issued a press
release to reiterate its intention to continue negotiations with EchoStar and
other competitors. 113 After mutually failing to agree on the time and place
114
of a meeting, EchoStar filed a declaratory judgment suit against Finisar.
Applying the "all circumstances" test, the court found an actual
controversy for declaratory judgment. 115 Despite repeated attempts by
Finisar to resolve the matter without resorting to litigation, the court
concluded that the combination of the outside suit against DirecTV and the
licensing discussions constituted a controversy between Finisar and
EchoStar. 116 The court even implied that the suit against DirecTV was not
needed and that the mere fact that EchoStar was confronted with an
infringement allegation during the licensing negotiations was sufficient to
constitute a controversy. 117
This case demonstrates that a patentee may not be able to conduct its
legal affairs in the way it pleases in one case without materially affecting
another case. 118 The secondary litigation against DirecTV may have been
more cost-effective or more tenable than any such suit against EchoStar.
However, by allowing the actions of Finisar against a third party (DirecTV)
to impute onto EchoStar, the court demonstrated the new position of
patentees under SanDisk: stuck between a rock-an offer of license
leading to litigation-and a hard place-not enforcing their patent rights
leading to litigation. 119 The circumstances presented in this case would
surely not satisfy the previous reasonable apprehension test; EchoStar had

110. See EchoStar, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 449; SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1374-77.
111. EchoStar, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 449.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 451.
116. Id. at 452.
117. EchoStar, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 452 ("[A]n actual controversy exists in the instant case
regardless of whether the licensing negotiations are ongoing." "By their communications with
respect to attempted licensing negotiations, Defendant accused Plaintiffs of infringing the...
patent .... ).
118. Id. (describing how the DirecTV infringement affected Echostar's negotiations).

119. Id.
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no "reasonable apprehension of suit." 120 Thus, the "all circumstances" test
essentially precludes patentees from offering licensing agreements. 121
Instead, the patentee is subject to the negative economic effects of
increased litigation and possible invalidation of patents. 122
2. Sony Electronics,Inc. v. GuardianMedia Technologies, Ltd.
In Sony, the district court and the Federal Circuit analyzed a
declaratory judgment through a patent dispute regarding V-chip
technologies. 123 Patentee Guardian contacted Sony with its analysis of a
potential infringement by Sony. 124 Over several years, Guardian attempted
to meet with Sony to discuss licensing proposals. 125 Sony eventually
responded by filing for declaratory judgment. 126
Interestingly, the case was argued and decided before the district
court under the traditional reasonable apprehension of suit test. 127 Under
this test, the district court did not find reasonable apprehension of a suit and
dismissed Sony's declaratory judgment action for lack ofjurisdiction. 128
Applying the new SanDisk test, 129 the circuit court reversed and held
that the lower court had jurisdiction to grant declaratory judgment relief. 130
The court held that Guardian's acts of contacting Sony and identifying the
possibly infringed patents in the licensing discussions created a justiciable
controversy. 131 In fact, the circuit court highlighted this point by stating,
"[i]n SanDisk we recognized that a patentee's apparent continued
willingness to engage in licensing negotiations does not prevent a plaintiff

120. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 2005 WL 5801276, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that under the reasonable
apprehension of suit test, the facts of SanDisk did not present a case or controversy). Analogizing
to the cases discussed, the facts in each are very similar to SanDisk. Thus, it is quite likely that
each of these highly similar cases would have been decided in the same way as the district court
decided in SanDisk.
121. SanDisk, 2005 WL 5801276 at *5.
122. See generally GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III & HIGHLEY, supra note 14
(discussing the implications of declaratory judgment, including the outcome of patent

invalidation).
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Sony Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
Id. at 1276.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1281.
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Sony, 497 F.3d at 1285.
Id. at 1285-86.
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from maintaining a declaratory judgment suit." 132 The circuit court
implied that the district court should have also held that a patentee's
engagement in such negotiations constitutes jurisdiction for declaratory
judgment-especially since Guardian merely contacted Sony and offered
patent licenses, thereby expressly indicating that Guardian believed Sony
was infringing on its patents. 133
Consequently, the new test forces the patentee, Guardian, out of a
frequently used business strategy (threatening infringement and offering
licenses) and subjects them to litigation in the form of a declaratory
judgment action. 134 Sony demonstrates and reinforces that patent licensing
is no longer a viable option for patentees like Guardian and that, in the
future, patentees will be forced into litigation. 135 Consequently, the high
costs of litigation will result in a more tenuous economic position for
patentees. 136
However, litigation may be the best forum for these companies to
resolve their differences. Why not permit these powerful companies to
demonstrate their mettle in a public forum? A neutral arbiter may fashion a
better remedy than any private license. Unfortunately, the staggering cost
of litigation in the United States heavily discounts this argument. 137
Requiring patentees and infringers to resolve their disputes before the
courts makes little sense, legally or as a business decision, when the cost of
litigation is so high and the freedom of contract reigns supreme. 138
Because of these drawbacks, arbitration may provide a better forum for
resolution. Surely, if parties may go before an arguably less expensive and
efficient arbiter, patentees should be permitted to offer licenses without the
accompanying consequences of litigation. 139
Furthermore, Sony implies, that the new rule is subject to infringer
abuse and overuse, because the infringer can gain a stronger foothold in the
132. Id. at 1286.
133. Id. at 1286.
134. See generally Berkenstock, supra note 31 (discussing strategies for dealing with
licensing infringers and the common use of patent licenses in patent dispute settlements).
135. SeeSony, 497 F.3d at 1271.
136. See Cost ofLitigation Haunts US. CorporationsMore than Winning Cases, supra note
103 (by pushing out patent licensing, patentees are forced into expensive litigation and out of
often profitable licenses).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972)
(explaining the public policy and constitutional requirement of freedom of contract).
139. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration'sSummer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of
Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871,
871-76 (2008) (discussing the ready availability of arbitration and arguments as to its efficiency

and cost-effectiveness).
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patent-driven economic sector, particularly with the aid of a low-threshold
judicial standard of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 140 Under this legal
threshold, what is to stop an infringer from abusing the "all circumstances"
test to invalidate a competitor's patents? The answer appears to be that
there is nothing to restrain such an infringer.
3. Crutchfield New Media, LLC v. CharlesE. Hill & Associates, Inc.
The facts of Crutchfield are exceedingly similar to SanDisk. 141
Patentee Hill contacted Crutchfield believing that Crutchfield was
infringing on Hill's patents. 142 Hill sent materials to Crutchfield including
an offer to Crutchfield to license Hill's patents. 143 Crutchfield refused the
licensing agreement and filed suit for declaratory judgment. 144 Shortly
Hill
thereafter, Hill responded with a patent infringement suit. 145
subsequently moved to dismiss Crutchfield's suit due to lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. 146
The Crutchfield court held that the case was indistinguishable from
SanDisk because Hill "put Crutchfield in the same category as other
Internet retailers against whom Hill had filed a patent infringement suit.,, 147
Similar to SanDisk, EchoStar, and Sony, the offer of a licensing agreement
established grounds for a damaging declaratory judgment action by the
infringer. 148 Despite Hill's past history of filing suit against other
companies, Hill wished to resolve the patent dispute through contractual
means. 149 Under the reasonable apprehension test, it is likely that
Crutchfield lacked a reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit based on the
materials sent by Hill. 150
140. See Sony, 497 F.3d at 1271.
141. Crutchfield New Media, LLC v. Charles E. Hill & Assocs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-0837LJM-JMS, 2007 WL 1320750, at *1, (S.D. Ind. May 4, 2007).
142. Id.
143. Id.

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Crutchfield, 2007 WL 1320750, at *2.
148. Id. at *1; see SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics NV Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2007); EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Del. 2007); Sony Elects.,
Inc. v. Guardian Media Tech., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding a licensing
agreement was grounds for a damaging declaratory judgment action).
149. Crutchfield, 2007 WL 1320750 at *1.
150. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005 WL 5801276, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The district court held
that under the reasonable apprehension of suit test, the facts of SanDisk did not present a case or
controversy. Analogizing to the cases discussed, the facts in each are very similar to SanDisk.
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In fact, the materials not only indicated that Hill believed Crutchfield
was infringing and that Hill would enforce its patents, but that under the
circumstances, Hill wished to settle the matter out of court with a licensing
agreement. 151 Under the reasonable apprehension test, it would be
unreasonable for Crutchfield to believe Hill's desire to negotiate a licensing
agreement would cause Crutchfield to apprehend suit. 152 Time and time
again, the new "all circumstances" test encourages increased patent
litigation, increased business costs, and destabilizes the patent-economic
marketplace. 153
4. Sabert Corp. v. Waddington North America, Inc.
The paradigm SanDisk scenario was again closely replicated in
Sabert. 154 Defendant-patentee Waddington was the assignee of a patent
relating to the production of food-service furniture and other articles. 155
However, unlike the majority of other declaratory judgment cases, 156 the
alleged infringer and plaintiff, Sabert, initiated contact with
Waddington. 157 Sabert claimed that Waddington's patent was invalid and
that Sabert would seek a hearing before the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office depending on Waddington's response. 158 Sabert desired a patent
because it had been using a related or similar technology to
Waddington's. 159
Waddington responded to Sabert's letter by indicating its
disagreement regarding the invalidity of the patent. 160 Furthermore,
Waddington ended the letter with an offer to license the patent to Sabert. ,61
Thus, it is quite likely that each of these highly similar cases would have been decided in the
same way that the district court decided the SanDisk case.
151. Crutchfield, 2007 WL 1320750, at *1.
152. SanDisk, 2005 WL 5801276, at *5 (discussing the reasonable apprehension test and
clearly delineating that discussion of a license does not constitute reasonable apprehension of
suit).
153. See Crutchfield, 2007 WL 1320750, at *2.
154. Sabert Corp. v. Waddington N. Am., Inc., No. 06-5423, 2007 WL 2705157, at *1

(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2007).
155. Id. at *1.
156. See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics NV Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir.
2007); EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Del. 2007); Sony Elects.,
Inc. v. Guardian Media Tech., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Crutchfield, 2007 WL
1320750 (four major declaratory judgment decisions).
157. Sabert, 2007 WL 2705157, at *1.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *2.
160. Id.at *1.
161. Id.
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Sabert replied with information regarding its fabrication process and a
sample of their product. 162 Waddington's last letter expressed a continued
interest in resolving the matter amicably. 163 In response, Sabert terminated
communications and filed a declaratory judgment action. 64
The district court denied Waddington's motion to dismiss for lack of
The district court pointed to the
subject-matter jurisdiction. 165
communications Waddington sent to Sabert, which placed Sabert in a
position that forced it to either litigate or illegally use a patent. 166 The
court believed that the facts closely mirrored those of SanDisk because
based on Waddington's communications, "it is clear that Waddington will
assert its rights under the '542 patent." 167
Sabert clearly delineates the lack of equilibrium between patentees
and alleged infringers. Patentee Waddington did little more than respond to
the accusations of Sabert regarding the validity of its patent. '68 However,
Waddington's disagreement with Sabert's assessment and the offer of a
license unsurprisingly worked against Waddington to create declaratory
judgment jurisdiction. 169 Also, though the court failed to discuss how
different the holding would have been prior to SanDisk, it is highly likely
that the action would have been dismissed. 70 The Sabert court further
explicated that Sabert very closely matched the scenario of SanDisk. 171
The Sabert court also interestingly failed to underscore the fact that
the alleged infringer first initiated contact with the pantentee. 172 At first
glance, this fact seems legally inoperative. However, the entire reason the
dispute between Waddington and Sabert came about is because of Sabert's
initial letter. 173 It seems unjust and improper for the court to ignore this
fact in considering whether the circumstances presented a case or
controversy for declaratory judgment jurisdiction.

162. Id. at *2.
163. Sabert, 2007 WL 2705157, at *2.
164. Id.
165. Id. at *7.
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id.
168. Id. at *1.
169. Sabert, 2007 WL 2705157, at *4.
170. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379JF, 2005 WL 5801276, at
*7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The district court used the
reasonable apprehension test and found a lack of declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
171. Sabert, 2007 WL 2705157, at *4; SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics NV Inc., 480
F.3d 1372, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
172. Sabert, 2007 WL 2705157, at *1.
173. Id.

2009]

COURTS SHARPEN INFRINGER'S SWORD

If an infringer need no longer await contact by a patentee with a
license, the result is disturbing to say the least. If such reasoning is
followed to its logical result, infringers may initiate declaratory judgment
actions quite easily by contacting patentees and accusing them of patent
invalidity. 174 The patentee will then disagree with the assessment and
perhaps offer a license. 17' This scenario highlights the dysfimction of the
"all circumstances" test to create any sort of genuine equilibrium between
patentees and infringer.
The Sabert court might argue that consideration of who contacted
whom first is irrelevant in assessing the "all circumstances" test. It could
be argued that the patentee contacts the infringer when establishing intent
to enforce patentee's patent rights. Yet, how can the court ignore the fact
that the infringing company initiated contact with an accusatory letter? 176
Such contact puts the patentee on the defensive and thereby corners it into a
position to assert and defend its patent rights. 177 To not consider such a
circumstance clearly ignores the very policy and purpose behind the
Declaratory Judgment Act. 178 As previously discussed, the Act was
enacted to prevent the danse macabre created by overbearing and
threatening patentees. 179 Yet, in contacting a patentee with an accusatory
letter, the infringer uses the declaratory judgment tool as an unbalancing
force to re-create the in terrorem choice in patentees. 180
C. A Disturbing Trend
The case studies discussed in this section evince a substantial pattern
of disequilibrium between patentees and infringers. 181 In almost every
scenario, a patentee initiated contact with an alleged infringer and offered
to license its patent portfolio. 182 Based upon the minimal communications,
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See infra part IV.A.2. (discussing and analyzing the policy behind the Declaratory
Judgment Act to preclude in terrorem choices).
179. See infra part IV.A.2.
180. See infra part IV.A.2.
181. See infra Part IV.B. (presenting and analyzing cases which typify the disequilibrium
between patentees and infingers).

182. See, e.g., SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2007); EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447, 449 (D. Del. 2007); Sony
Elecs., Inc. v. Guardian Media Techs., Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Crutchfield
New Media, LLC v. Charles E. Hill & Assocs., Inc., No. 1:06-cv-0837-LJM-JMS, 2007 WL
1320750, at *1 (S.D. Ind. May 4, 2007).

426

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:407

the court in each case found declaratory judgment jurisdiction. 183
In Sabert, the court glossed over the fact that the alleged infringer
first initiated contact with the patentee. 184 Furthermore, it is likely that
each of these cases would have resulted in a dismissal due to lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction under the reasonable apprehension test. 185 Now
that the extensive problems with the new test have been analyzed and
brought to the surface, proposed solutions must be discussed.
IV. RESTORING BALANCE: SEARCHING FOR AN EQUILIBRIUM

A. District CourtDiscretion: The Choice to Hear DeclaratoryJudgment
Suits
1. Questioning the Solution
One possible resolution to the imbalance created by the SanDisk "all
circumstances" test is rooted in the text of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. 186 In relevant part, the Act states that "any court of the United
States... may declare the rights ... of any interested party."'
Based
upon the word "may," courts have interpreted this section of the statute to
mean that district courts may refuse to hear a declaratory judgment
action. 188 This interpretation of the Act 189 invokes the question: does a
district court judge have the capacity to dismiss a declaratory judgment to
remedy the imbalance created by the "all circumstances" test?
Before proceeding to analyze the scope of a district court's discretion,
one should think about how such a remedy could solve the disparity
between patentees and infringers. The exercise of a district court's
discretion will likely provide only a partial solution. One can presuppose
that a district court may dismiss declaratory judgment suits initiated by
183. See, e.g., SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1382; EchoStar, 515 F. Supp. 2d at 452; Sony, 497 F.3d
at 1285; Crutchfield, 2007 WL 1320750, at *3.
184. Sabert Corp. v. Waddington N. Am., Inc., No. 06-5423, 2007 WL 2705157, at *1
(D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2007).
185. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379 JF, 2005 WL 5801276
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see supra note 120 for
explanation of the holding of the lower SanDisk court and its implications.
186. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
187. Id. (emphasis added).
188. See e.g., Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co., 998 F.2d 931, 936 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491,494 (1942).
189. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
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infringers whom appear to have abused the "all circumstances" test. 190
However, by removing the element of abuse, a district court is likely bound
by the mandatory authority of SanDisk. 91
Nonetheless, where there is clear evidence of abuse, the court should
be able to use public policy goals to prevent the fraudulent use of the
judicial system to circumvent the SanDisk test. When an infringer meets
all the requirements of the "all circumstances" test, it appears that a district
court may do little to dismiss the suit without committing reversible
error. 192 The district court must cite strong public policy reasons to void
jurisdiction. 193 If judges can dismiss declaratory judgment actions in
situations involving at least some demonstrable abuse, then it is likely that
courts can remedy some of the imbalance between patentees and infringers
at the extremes of the spectrum. 194
2. The Dismissal by Discretion Standard
The Supreme Court has stated that a court has "unique and substantial
discretion" to dismiss a declaratory judgment suit for lack of
jurisdiction. '9' Some courts have indicated that the discretion power is not
plenary, 196 and "[t]here must be well-founded reasons for declining to
entertain a declaratory judgment action." 197 Appellate courts use an abuse
of discretion standard when reviewing a district court's denial to hear a
declaratory judgment. 198 A district court abuses its discretion when: "(1)
the court's decision was clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the
decision was based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the court's
findings were clearly erroneous; or (4) the record contains no
evidence
99
upon which the court rationally could have based its decision."'
In Electronics for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, the Federal Circuit
recognized that district courts may assert discretion if the suit does not

190. See infra Part IV.A.2. (explaining the district courts' dismissal by discretion authority).
191. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
192. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 3, 1 Stat. 73-74 (establishing the inferior federal
courts and thereby makes them subordinate to each higher level of court).
193. See supra Part 1I (analyzing the ability of district courts to dismiss declaratory
judgment actions on the basis of public policy).
194. See supra Part II.
195. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995).
196. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
197. Id., citing Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prods., 387 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
198. Elecs. for Imaging, 394 F.3d at 1345.
199. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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meet the public policy goals of the Act. 200 These goals include avoiding
uncertainty and obviating scare-and-run tactics. 20 1 Such public policy
goals would most likely not be met and, in fact, would be negated by an
infringer abusing the Act. In Electronics for Imaging, the court also
indicated that lower courts have the discretion to consider injustice as a
controlling factor. 202 However, district courts should continue to consider
issues of equity, fairness, and203
the purpose of the declaratory judgment suit,
Mansour.
v.
Green
in
as held
3. A Partial Solution
Under the scenario where an infringer abuses the "all circumstances"
test, a district court may dismiss a declaratory judgment action if certain
factors are present. 204 To alleviate some of the top-level imbalance abusers
have created under the SanDisk test, a district court judge can utilize public
policy goals articulated by the federal courts to dismiss such suits. 205
Based on the policy goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act, it appears that
an infringer who abuses the "all circumstances" test should have its claim
dismissed by a district court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The following hypothetical scenario best illustrates this proposed solution.
Imagine that Company Pharma Z is a patentee that believes that Company Biotech

X is infringing several of its patents for cell lines. Pharma Z contacts Biotech X to
begin negotiations for a licensing agreement. Biotech X, having attorneys well
versed in recent patent case law, decides to take advantage of the SanDisk test.
Pharma Z has never sued for patent infringement and in the past has settled such

disputes by licensing. Biotech X is aware that it is infringing yet believes that it
has a good chance to defeat Pharma Z in court. Biotech X also believes that if it

files suit now, it can forum shop, conferring further advantages. Biotech X sues
Pharma Z in a declaratory judgment action, demanding relief in the form of patent
invalidity, noninfringement,. or both.

Although extreme, this example illustrates an abuse scenario. In a
similar case, or even in cases with less polarizing facts, a district court
200. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
201. Elecs. for Imaging, 394 F.3d at 1346.
202. Id. at 1348.
203. 474 U.S. 64, 72 (1985); see also, Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665,
672 (9th Cir. 2004) ; Am. States Ins. Co. v. Kearns, 15 F.3d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1994); Am. Econ.
Ins. Co. v. Williams, 805 F. Supp. 859, 863 (D. Idaho 1992).
204. See supra Part II (explaining the dismissal by discretion standard).
205. See Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286 (1995) (holding that district courts
have substantial discretion to dismiss declaratory judgment suits).
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should dismiss the action for reasons of justice, fairness, and furthering the
policy goals of the Declaratory Judgment Act. 206 Nevertheless, to avoid
error the district court must adhere to the standard as expressed in Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co. 207
As discussed above, this solution is only partial because it can only
remedy the extreme cases, otherwise, under the requirements of Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., it is unlikely that a district court would have sufficient
evidence to dismiss the action. 208 Dismissal by discretion is a viable
option to aid patentees in severe situations of infringer abuse. However,
the proposed solution will fail to act as a catch-all remedy because it is
merely a bandage for the gaping wound created by the new test in SanDisk.
B. Covenants Not to Sue Are Insufficient
In Judge Bryson's concurring opinion in SanDisk, he emphasized that
a promise not to sue does not void declaratory judgment jurisdiction under
the reasonable apprehension test. 209 However, the court in SanDisk did not
discuss the implications of a covenant not to sue. 210 The difference
between a promise not to sue and a covenant not to sue is that a promise is
not enforceable. 211 A covenant not to sue is drafted into a patent licensing
agreement or other business contract in which both the patentee and the
alleged infringer have bargained for, and offered, consideration.2 12 There
is nothing to indicate that such a covenant would be invalid under contract
law because under common law giving up the right to sue is valid
consideration. 213
Nonetheless, a covenant not to sue is certainly not the magic bullet for
the imbalance in patent licensing because its enforcement depends on the
time in which the parties enter into the agreement. A covenant not to sue
would appear, if at all, in a licensing agreement between the patentee and
206. See Elecs. for Imaging, 394 F.3d 1341, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (permitting dismissal by
discretion based upon public policy goals including justice, fairness).
207. 929 F.2d 670, 673 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (requiring district courts to have actual and
convincing evidence of abuse).
208. Id.
209. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1374, 1384 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (Bryson, J., concurring).
210. Id.
211. See Baehr v. Penn-O-Tex Oil Corp., 104 N.W.2d 661, 666 (Minn. 1960) (noting that a
promise not to sue presumably lacks consideration).
212. Mathis v. St. Alexis Hosp., 650 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a

covenant not to sue is to be treated as a contract).
213. See, e.g. Baehr, 104 N.W.2d 661 (upholding the validity of forbearance to sue as
consideration).
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licensee. 114 The crucial period of imbalance falls before such a patent
licensing agreement is finalized.215 Notably, in every case discussed
above, the parties did not reach an agreement. 216 Under the new test, it
appears infringers can bring suit immediately after a patentee offers a
license, thereby rendering the covenant not to sue useless to protect
patentees. 217
One suggestion for patentees is that they should contract to negotiate
in the future. 218 The first agreement could contain the covenant no to sue.
Unfortunately, this solution would likely fail because an infringer has little
reason to burden its litigation rights in a pre-agreement. 219 In fact, the
patentees that take advantage of the new test would never need to agree to a
covenant not to sue. Therefore, patentees need to find an alternative
remedy to their disadvantaged status.
C. A Legislative Solution
A legislative solution to the lack of equilibrium between patentees
and infringers is the most parsimonious yet seemingly difficult solution to
achieve. 220 As discussed above, district and appellate courts only have
limited power to dismiss actions by discretion. 221 Considering the
214. The only contract that would be at issue between a patentee and an infringer is a patent
license.
215. See supra Part III.B (discussing and analyzing cases in which the infringer filed for
declaratory judgment before any license agreement was agreed upon).
216. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
EchoStar Satellite LLC v. Finisar Corp., 515 F. Supp. 2d 447 (D. Del. 2007); Sony Electronics,
Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd., 497 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2007); Crutchfield New
Media, LLC v. Charles E. Hill & Associates, Inc., No. l:06-cv-0837-LJM-JMS, 2007 WL
1320750 (S.D. Ind. May 4, 2007); Sabert Corp. v. Waddington North America, Inc., No. 06-

(5423CJA), 2007 WL 2705157 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2007).
217. See supra Part III (analyzing cases which demonstrate that upon the offer of a license,
the patentee is subject to declaratory judgment).
218. See, e.g., Quake Constr., Inc. v. Am. Airlines, Inc. 565 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. 1990)
(discussing the availability of a "formal contract" contemplated as a form of an agreement to
negotiate).
219. The infringer has no incentive to make an agreement to agree. Thus, if they contract,
they are only preventing themselves from litigating and essentially bending themselves to the will
of the patentee.
220. Congressional action is arguably a very slow and protracted process which is often
seen as out of touch from the desires and hopes of the individual. Thus, such a proposed solution
is likely to require extensive lobbying by patentees and their supporters, whom undoubtedly have
the resources to tap into the modem legislative process; see Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty
Interpretation,86 TEX. L. REv. 777, 795 (2008) ("[T]he Legislature is multitudinous, slow, and
comprised of various interests and backgrounds.").
221. See supra Part IV.A.3 (discussing dismissal by discretion as a partial solution to the

imbalance).
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Supreme Court's recent decision in MedImmune and its general trend
towards limiting the rights of patentees, it is unlikely that the Court will
change any of its decisions at this time. 222
Congress must ultimately amend the Act, the central statute at
issue. 223 Stt
State le
legislatures are powerless to enact their own patent
legislation because any statutes that could solve the imbalance between
patentees and inifringers would burden and conflict with the Act.224
Therefore, federal law would preempt any state patent legislation. 225
Consequently, the solution must originate from Congress.
The Act has been amended multiple times since its first enactment,
with the latest amendment in 1993.226 However, all changes to the Act
have been superficial - changing of dates and adding references to other
sections of the U.S. Code. 227 Thus, it seems that Congress has paid little
attention to the Act regarding patent law disputes.
1. The Proposed Amendment
The proposed amendment to the Declaratory Judgment Act contains
only two short sections and would not render the Act more difficult to
understand. 228 In fact, the proposed amendment would clarify the law.
Congress should add section (c) to the Act which would state in relevant
part:
(1) A district court has full discretion to dismiss a declaratory
judgment action brought before it. The court will consider issues
of fairness, equity, and justice in determining if the action
should be dismissed. (2) For the purposes of this Act, the mere
offer of a license by a patentee to an alleged infringer or any
other party will not confer declaratory judgment jurisdiction. (3)
In declaratory judgment actions for patent invalidity and/or
222. See generally, MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); P. Jean
Baker, Patent Litigation: A Radically Changed Environment for Licensors and Licensees, 2

INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 12 (2008) (highlighting the recent Supreme Court decisions on patent
law issues and concluding that patent litigation is now filled with uncertainty and patents are

more difficult to obtain).
223. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
224. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 22829 (1964) (although some states have enacted their own declaratory judgment provisions, patent
law is within the sole domain of the federal government).

225. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
226. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).

227. See id, amended by Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 505 (2006)).
228. Id.
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noninfringment, a district court will have subject-matter
jurisdiction only if the declaratory judgment plaintiff reasonably
apprehends suit. 229
2. Analysis of the Amendment
Subsection one of the proposed amendment will clarify and reinforce
the power of a district court to dismiss declaratory judgments. Subsection
two, referring only to patent law disputes, will substantially undermine the
"all circumstances" test. It will permit patentees to once again offer
licenses without the fear of a declaratory judgment action. This will greatly
assist in recreating an equilibrium between the patentee and the infringer.
Thus, this proposed amendment will promote the policy goals of building
amicable business relations and a stable patent-centered economy.
By restoring the "reasonable apprehension" test, infringers will no
longer be able to improperly take advantage of filing declaratory
judgments. 230 Further, patentees will again be able to offer licenses to
infringers and avoid expensive litigation. 231 In accomplishing these tasks,
the equilibrium will be substantially re-established. Lastly, subsection
three essentially overrules MedImmune and SanDisk and rightly reinstates
the reasonable apprehension test.
This amendment will put patentees on equal footing with infringers.
It should be noted that the final subsection refers only to patent law
disputes. This limitation exists to narrowly tailor the amendment to avoid
affecting other applications of the declaratory judgment in non-patent law
cases. If anything, these proposed amendments will cause a case or
controversy to be evaluated under the reasonable apprehension test, which
is a more difficult standard to meet than the "all circumstances" test. 232
V. CONCLUSION

The imbalance between patentees and infringers after MedImmune
and SanDisk is dangerous for the modem marketplace, particularly for
The
biotechnological, pharmaceutical, and electronics businesses.
destruction of a single patent through declaratory judgment can result in
229. See Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d 1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(discussing some of these proposals).
230. See SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. C 04-04379JF, 2005 WL 5801276,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2005), vacated, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (applying the
"reasonable apprehension" standard, the district court dismissed the declaratory judgment action).
231. Id. (permitting the offer of a license and dismissing the suit for declaratory judgment).
232. SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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dramatic changes to the stock value and profitability of a company. 233
Infringers will take advantage of the poor position of patentees in an
attempt to force themselves into the market. Some argue that economic
conditions will still be balanced despite companies (patentees) losing their
patent rights and positions in the market to infringers. 234 Although this
Article does not discuss the detailed economic implications of the SanDisk
opinion, the above argument is misguided. The invalidation of a patent
does not automatically transfer the economic success or goodwill from the
patentee corporation to the infringer. Instead, the economic impact will be
felt because patentees will suffer from the damage to businesses
relationships, the cost of more frequent litigation, and the elimination of
licensing proposals. 235
Economics aside, the rule of law created in SanDisk creates a
discrepancy in the legal positions of patentees and infringers. 236 It should
be the goal of the legal system to establish rules which further equity and
justice-a goal damaged by the current state of the Act. If the proposed
measures of dismissal by discretion and legislative amendment are
examined and put into effect, a positive re-equilibrium will be reached, thus
restoring equity and encouraging the exchange of technology.

233. See id.; see also Herper, supra note 27 (discussing the dramatic drop in the stock value
of a pharmaceutical company after patent invalidation).
234. See GLADSTONE MILLS III, REILEY III & HIGHLEY, supra note 14 (explaining that
before the Declaratory Judgment Act, competitors were often victimized by patentees, but
following the Act the infringer has recourse, resulting in more economic balance).
235. See Herper, supra note 27 (explaining that patentees already suffer enough).
236. See generally SanDisk, 480 F.3d 1372.

